

2016-17 Comparative Comps Exam Handbook

Political Science | Columbia University

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Topic ID	Cluster Name	Topic	CP Seminar 1	CP Seminar 2
1.1	Approaches	Causal Inference and Identification		
1.2	Approaches	Qualitative Methods, Case Studies, & Process-Tracing [Fall:16]	1	
1.3	Approaches	Models of Politics [Fall:16]		
2.1	Primitives	Collective Action & Applications [Fall:16]	1	
2.2	Primitives	Bargaining & Applications		
2.3	Primitives	Groups & Coalitions [Fall:16]	1	
2.4	Primitives	Identity Politics [Fall:16]	1	
2.5	Primitives	Political Culture [Fall:16]	1	
2.6	Primitives	Institutions [Spring:17]		1
3.1	Political Structures	The State, Institutions, & State Strength [Spring:17 – two weeks]		1
3.2	Political Structures	Parties & Democratic Systems [Spring:17]		1
3.3	Political Structures	Voting, Elections, & Electoral Systems [Spring:17 – two weeks]		1
3.4	Political Structures	Non-Democratic Systems [Spring:17]		1
4.1	Outcomes I	Political Violence [Spring:17]		1
4.2	Outcomes I	Non-Electoral Participation [Fall:16]	1	
4.3	Outcomes I	Revolutions and Regime Change [Fall:16]	1	
4.4	Outcomes I	Democratization [Fall:16]	1	
5.1	Outcomes II	Electoral Participation [Spring:17]		1
5.2	Outcomes II	Accountability & Citizen/Politician Linkages [Fall:16]	1	
5.3	Outcomes II	Corruption [Spring:17]		1
6.1	Outcomes III	Inequality & Polarization [Spring:17]		1
6.2	Outcomes III	Growth [Spring:17]		1
6.3	Outcomes III	Redistribution & The Welfare State [Fall:16]	1	
6.4	Outcomes III	Policy Choice & Policy Reform [Fall:16]	1	

Table 1: Clusters and Topics

1. Readings and Clusters

Students will be expected to have deep knowledge of the arguments and evidence contained in the core reading list. The reading list will generally include between about 125 readings, each of relevance to one or two topics. *In addition to the core reading list students will be expected to be familiar with all Comparative Politics articles published in the APSR in the twelve months prior to the examination in question.*

This list exposes you to a diversity of approaches, theoretical perspectives, and thematic areas. It should not however be considered a “canon” — while most of the readings have been influential this does not mean that they are uniformly compelling; nor does omission from the list suggest readings are unimportant. You are **encouraged to read well beyond this list** as you engage deeply with topics; nevertheless it will be **possible** to pass your comprehensive exams drawing solely on deep understanding of the readings on this list and your ability to reason about research strategies and cases.

2. Readings, Classes & Exams

The readings have been roughly allocated across two semesters of the Comparative Politics Field Seminar and you can expect that one topic will be covered in each seminar in each week on average, though instructors may split or aggregate topics differently in different years and may select which readings to treat as required readings for class discussion purposes differently in different years.

The reading list is liable to be updated from year to year. Exams will be based on the reading list of the immediately preceding year. So for example exams in May and September 2016 and January 2017 will be based on the 2015-2016 academic year list.

3. How to Read

The Comps reading list is not especially large. But some readings are hard. You should aim to read carefully and reflectively. Here are guides to critiquing and to reading.

4. Exam Structure

The exam contain **nine** questions divided into 6 sections plus a wildcard section as described below.

1. Majors will be required to answer 3 questions from at least three different sections.
2. Minors will be required to answer 2 questions from at least two different sections.
3. Questions in each section are likely to draw on knowledge of the theoretic and empirical literatures as well as well as knowledge of cases.
4. Some questions might request commentary and critique on specific readings from the list.

The structure of this exam is designed to ensure more regular and predictable coverage of the major topics covered in the survey courses.

5. Writing Good Exam Answers

A good answer to a Comps exam question:

1. **Answers the question.** It is very common to write questions that are only tangentially related to the question. Students routinely fail to answer questions of the form: “Is the effect of X on Y different in A areas and in B areas”, in some cases describing only the effects of X on Y or the differences in Y between areas, or the differences in X. Very often time is lost discussing what X is and whether it is a useful concept. There are no points for those kinds of answers. Engage in conceptual clarification only to the extent that it is asked in the question and to the extent that it is necessary to make sense of your answer. If essential you can have a short paragraph early on that stipulates and/or justifies what definitions you will use.
2. **Is structured.** Don't start writing immediately. Sit back and think about the question. Jot down the three or four major points you want to make. Think about how they relate to each other and whether they can be ordered or developed in an integrated way. Note the key research you want to engage with for each point. Anticipate how others would critique your arguments and provide counter critiques. Only then start writing.
3. **Has signposting.** At the beginning say what you are going to say. Make your main points upfront and provide a structure. Put short headers in bold over various sections so that people can see quickly where the action is.
4. **Shows awareness of the big picture but goes deeper.** The hardest thing about Comps essays is that large questions are covered but space is very constrained. Should you give short overviews of a dozen approaches or should you go deeply in to one or two. The first approach risks looking shallow, the second narrow. An effective approach is to lead sections with a rapid overview, gathering contributions together analytically and then going into more depth in a small number, justified by your overview. (Of the form: “One set of authors focuses on domestic factors (a,b,c,d), others focus on the role of international pressures (e,f,g,h); more recently authors have argued that these factors interact and you cannot understand the effects of one without understanding the other (i,j,k). Since the arguments of this third group are more general than the first two I focus my discussion on two studies in this third set.”)
5. **Is not about you.** You should have a voice but this is not about you. Graders will want to see you engaging critically with the work, they want to hear your views but they are interested in your arguments not your opinions. Avoid hyperbole. Whether you find something exciting, fantastic, or boring is not relevant; whether something is seminal or groundbreaking is relevant, but you need to say why it is seminal or groundbreaking. Avoid unnecessary adjectives and avoid all adjectives that you cannot substantively defend.
6. **Says something new.** Comps essays don't have to say something new, but it is nice when they do. Closing off with some speculations or hypotheses based on the preceding discussion, or a proposal for an approach to better address some problem, can be a satisfying way to end a comps essay. You have more rope to take a risk here if the preceding discussion on the existing literature is solid.

6. Sample Exam (Largely Drawn From Jan 2014 Exam)

Majors: Please answer three questions from at least three different sections. Minors: Please answer two questions from two different sections.

In each essay, you should:

- Answer the question that is asked. Refine if necessary but do not expand.
- Discuss at least two theoretical accounts and at least two bodies of evidence as they relate to the theories (a body of evidence is a study or related set of studies that address a problem empirically).
- Include critical assessments of the theoretical and empirical literatures that you discuss.

Section I: Approaches

1. Some argue that while case studies may be useful for generating theoretical insights, quantitative analysis is needed to test theories. Provide arguments in favor or against the proposition with illustrations from research in comparative politics.

Section II: Primitives

2. Are models of collective action useful for understanding participation in contentious politics (choose a class of political events e.g. violence, protests, strikes or other)? Discuss in the light of at least two theories and empirical evidence.
3. Describe and critique at least two theories or empirical accounts for why social conflict is sometimes organized along identity (e.g. race, class, gender) lines.

Section III: Political Structures

4. Why do electoral rules vary across countries? What arguments have authors put forward to account for this variation and which do you find most convincing? Please discuss with reference to at least two countries.
5. In different parts of the world we have seen dramatic shifts in voting patterns and party systems. Why? In your answer, draw on appropriate theory and compare two cases.

Section IV: Outcomes I

6. Do the same factors that explain participation in violence by individuals also explain onset of violence in polities?

Section V: Outcomes II

7. Why do authoritarian regimes survive in some places but not others? Discuss with reference to at least two theories and two cases or empirical analyses.

Section VI: Outcomes III

8. Under what conditions are elections most likely to result in the representation of citizens preferences? In your answer describe the logic and evidence for at least two factors that matter.

Section VII: Wildcard

9. Why did *Syriza* call a referendum in the middle of the bailout negotiations? *Remember to use theory and evidence from the study of Comparative Politics.*

END

7. 2016-17 Comps Reading List

1. Approaches

1.1. Causal Inference and Identification

1. Alan S. Gerber and Donald P. Green. *Field Experiments: Design, Analysis, and Interpretation*. W W Norton & Company Incorporated, 2012. ISBN 9780393979954 Chapter 2.
2. James Mahoney. Strategies of causal inference in small-n analysis. *Sociological Methods & Research*, 28(4):387–424, 2000. URL <http://smr.sagepub.com/content/28/4/387.abstract>
3. Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. *Designing Social Inquiry*. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, May 1994. ISBN 0691034710 Chapter 3.
4. Thad Dunning. Improving causal inference: Strengths and limitations of natural experiments. *Political Research Quarterly*, 61(2):282–293, 2008. doi: 10.1177/1065912907306470. URL <http://prq.sagepub.com/content/61/2/282.abstract>
5. Luke J. Keele and Rocío Titiunik. Geographic boundaries as regression discontinuities. *Political Analysis*, 23(1):127–155, 2015. doi: 10.1093/pan/mpu014. URL <http://pan.oxfordjournals.org/content/23/1/127.abstract>

1.2. Qualitative Methods, Case Studies, & Process-Tracing [Fall:16]

1. Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman. Complex causal relations and case study methods: The example of path dependence. *Political Analysis*, 14(3):250–267, 2006b. doi: 10.1093/pan/mpj020. URL <http://pan.oxfordjournals.org/content/14/3/250.abstract>
2. Scott E. Page. Path dependence. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 1(1):87–115, 2006. ISSN 1554-0626. doi: 10.1561/100.00000006. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00000006>
3. James Mahoney and Gary Goertz. A tale of two cultures: Contrasting quantitative and qualitative research. *Political Analysis*, 14(3):227–249, 2006. URL <http://pan.oxfordjournals.org/content/14/3/227.short>
4. Lisa Wedeen. Reflections on ethnographic work in political science. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 13(1):255–272, 2010. doi: doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.052706.123951. URL <http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.052706.123951>
5. Elisabeth Jean Wood. *Insurgent collective action and civil war in El Salvador*. Cambridge University Press, 2003 Chapter 2

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- Macartan Humphreys and Alan Jacobs. Mixing Methods: A Bayesian Approach. *Working Paper*, 2015. URL <http://www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/papers1/BIQQ.pdf>
 - Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. *Designing Social Inquiry*. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, May 1994. ISBN 0691034710 Chapter 1

- Barbara Geddes. How the cases you choose affect the answers you get: Selection bias in comparative politics. *Political Analysis*, 2(1):131–150, 1990. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23317768>
- Evan S. Lieberman. Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research. *American Political Science Review*, 99(03):435–452, 2005. doi: 10.1017/s0003055405051762. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30038950>
- Herbert Kitschelt. Accounting for post-communist regime diversity. *What Counts as a Good Cause*, pages 49–88, 2003
- Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman. Qualitative research: Recent developments in case study methods. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 9:455–476, 2006a. URL <http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.082103.104918>

1.3. Models of Politics [Fall:16]

1. Lisa Wedeen. Conceptualizing culture: Possibilities for political science. *American Political Science Review*, 96(04):713–728, 2002. ISSN 1537-5943. doi: doi:10.1017/S0003055402000400. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055402000400>
2. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions. *The Journal of Business*, 59(4), 1986. ISSN 00219398. doi: 10.2307/2352759. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2352759>
3. Kevin A. Clarke and David M. Primo. Modernizing political science: A model-based approach. *Perspectives on Politics*, 5(04):741–753, 2007. ISSN 1541-0986. doi: doi:10.1017/S1537592707072192. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1537592707072192>
4. Kathleen Thelen. Historical institutionalism in comparative politics. *Annual review of political science*, 2(1):369–404, 1999. URL <http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.369>

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- Kenneth J. Arrow. Methodological Individualism and Social Knowledge. *The American Economic Review*, 84(2):1–9, 1994. ISSN 00028282. doi: 10.2307/2117792. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2117792>
 - Ann Swidler. Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies. *American Sociological Review*, 51(2):273–286, 1986. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2095521>
 - Daniel Diermeier and Keith Krehbiel. Institutionalism as a methodology. *Journal of theoretical politics*, 15(2):123–144, 2003. URL <http://jtp.sagepub.com/content/15/2/123.full.pdf+html>
 - John C Harsanyi. Advances in understanding rational behavior. *Foundational Problems in the Special Sciences*, 1:315, 1977 (also reprinted in Jon Elster, *Rational Choice*)

2. Primitives

2.1. Collective Action & Applications [Fall:16]

1. Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. Toward an integrated perspective on social movements and revolutions. *Comparative politics: Rationality, culture, and structure*, 1997

2. Mancur Olson. *The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups*. Harvard Economic Studies. Harvard University Press, 1965. ISBN 9780674041660 Chapters 1 and 2
3. Mark Granovetter. Threshold Models of Collective Behavior. *American Journal of Sociology*, 83 (6):1420–1443, 1978. ISSN 00029602. doi: 10.2307/2778111. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2778111>
4. Guillermo Trejo. Religious competition and ethnic mobilization in latin america: Why the catholic church promotes indigenous movements in mexico. *American Political Science Review*, 103(03):323–342, 2009. ISSN 1537-5943. doi: doi:10.1017/S0003055409990025. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055409990025>

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- Peter A. Hall and David. Soskice. *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*. Oxford University Press, 2003. ISBN 9780191647703
 - Kenneth J. Arrow. Methodological Individualism and Social Knowledge. *The American Economic Review*, 84(2):1–9, 1994. ISSN 00028282. doi: 10.2307/2117792. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2117792>
 - James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. *The American Political Science Review*, 97(1):75–90, 2003. ISSN 00030554. doi: 10.2307/3118222. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3118222>
 - Ted R Gurr. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton University Press, 1970
 - Ken A. Shepsle and Mark S. Bonchek. *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions*. W. W. Norton, 1 edition, December 1996. ISBN 0393971074, Chapters 8 and 9.
 - David A. Siegel. Social networks and collective action. *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(1): 122–138, 2009. ISSN 1540-5907. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00361.x. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00361.x>
 - Timur Kuran. Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989. *World Politics*, 44(1):7–48, 1991. ISSN 00438871. doi: 10.2307/2010422. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2010422>
 - James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. Explaining Interethnic Cooperation. *The American Political Science Review*, 90(4):715–735, 1996. ISSN 00030554. doi: 10.2307/2945838. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2945838>

2.2. Bargaining & Applications

1. Ronald Harry Coase. The problem of social cost. *Journal of Law and Economics*, 3:1, 1960. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/724810>
2. James D Fearon. Rationalist explanations for war. *International organization*, 49:379–379, 1995. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706903>
3. Lars Calmfors, John Driffill, Seppo Honkapohja, and Francesco Giavazzi. Bargaining structure, corporatism and macroeconomic performance. *Economic Policy*, pages 14–61, 1988. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1344503>

4. Andrew Kydd and Barbara F Walter. Sabotaging the peace: The politics of extremist violence. *International Organization*, 56(02):263–296, 2002. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/002081802320005487>

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- Torben Iversen. Power, Flexibility, and the Breakdown of Centralized Wage Bargaining: Denmark and Sweden in Comparative Perspective. *Comparative Politics*, 28(4):399–436, 1996. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/422051>
 - Isabela Mares. *Taxation, wage bargaining, and unemployment*. Cambridge University Press, 2006
 - David Austen-Smith and Timothy J. Feddersen. Deliberation, preference uncertainty, and voting rules. *American Political Science Review*, null:209–217, 5 2006. ISSN 1537-5943. doi: 10.1017/S0003055406062113. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27644345>

2.3. Groups & Coalitions [Fall:16]

1. William H. Riker. Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions. *The American Political Science Review*, 74(2):432–446, 1980. ISSN 00030554. doi: 10.2307/1960638. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1960638>
2. Michael J Hiscox. Class versus industry cleavages: inter-industry factor mobility and the politics of trade. *International Organization*, 55(01):1–46, 2001. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/002081801551405>
3. Peter A. Hall and David. Soskice. *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*. Oxford University Press, 2003. ISBN 9780191647703
4. Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier. Inducements versus constraints: Disaggregating “corporatism”. *The American Political Science Review*, pages 967–986, 1979. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1953982>
5. Isabela Mares. The sources of business interest in social insurance: Sectoral versus national differences. *World Politics*, 55(02):229–258, 2003b. ISSN 1086-3338. doi: doi:10.1353/wp.2003.0012. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/wp.2003.0012>

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- Lars Calmfors, John Driffill, Seppo Honkapohja, and Francesco Giavazzi. Bargaining structure, corporatism and macroeconomic performance. *Economic Policy*, pages 14–61, 1988. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1344503>
 - Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle. Coalitions and Cabinet Government. *American Political Science Review*, 84(3):873–890, 1990. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1962770>
 - I. Mares. *The Politics of Social Risk: Business and Welfare State Development*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge University Press, 2003a. ISBN 9780521534772
 - Maria Victoria Murillo. *Labor unions, partisan coalitions and market reforms in Latin America*. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2001
 - David Soskice. Wage determination: the changing role of institutions in advanced industrialized countries. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, pages 36–61, 1990. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23606157>

- R. Michael Alvarez, Geoffrey Garrett, and Peter Lange. Government partisanship, labor organization, and macroeconomic performance. *American Political Science Review*, 85(02):539–556, 1991. ISSN 1537-5943. doi: doi:10.2307/1963174. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1963174>
- Claus Offe and Helmut Wiesenthal. Two logics of collective action: Theoretical notes on social class and organizational form. *Political power and social theory*, 1(1):67–115, 1980. URL <http://www.hwiesenthal.de/downloads/2logics.pdf>
- Charles Edward Lindblom. *Politics and markets : the world's political-economic systems*. Basic Books, New York :, 1977. ISBN 0465059570

2.4. Identity Politics [Fall:16]

1. Rogers Brubaker. Ethnicity without groups. *European Journal of Sociology / Archives Europennes de Sociologie*, 43(02):163–189, 2002. ISSN 1474-0583. doi: doi:10.1017/S0003975602001066. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003975602001066>
2. Moses Shayo. A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy: Nation, Class, and Redistribution. *American Political Science Review*, 103(02):147–174, 2009. doi: 10.1017/s0003055409090194. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27798495>
3. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. Explaining Interethnic Cooperation. *The American Political Science Review*, 90(4):715–735, 1996. ISSN 00030554. doi: 10.2307/2945838. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2945838>
4. Kanchan Chandra. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge University Press, 2007. ISBN 9780521891417. URL <http://tinyurl.com/kchandra-intro> Introduction
5. John D. Huber. Measuring ethnic voting: Do proportional electoral laws politicize ethnicity? *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(4):986–1001, 2012. ISSN 1540-5907. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00601.x. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00601.x>

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- Raghavendra Chattopadhyay and Esther Duflo. Women as policy makers: Evidence from a randomized policy experiment in india. *Econometrica*, 72(5):1409–1443, 2004. ISSN 1468-0262. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00539.x. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3598894>
 - Alberto Alesina, Reza Baqir, and William Easterly. Public goods and ethnic divisions. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1997a. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w6009>
 - James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. *The American Political Science Review*, 97(1):75–90, 2003. ISSN 00030554. doi: 10.2307/3118222. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3118222>
 - Edward Miguel. Tribe or nation? nation building and public goods in kenya versus tanzania. *World Politics*, 56(03):328–362, 2004. ISSN 1086-3338. doi: doi:10.1017/S0043887100004330. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100004330>
 - Robert H. Bates. Ethnic competition and modernization in contemporary africa. *Comparative Political Studies*, 6(4):457–484, 1974. URL <http://cps.sagepub.com/content/6/4/457.full.pdf+html>

- Guillaume R Fréchette, Francois Maniquet, and Massimo Morelli. Incumbents' interests and gender quotas. *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(4):891–909, 2008. URL <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00349.x/full>
- Benedict Anderson. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London, New York, 1983
- Gellner Ernest. Thought and change. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson*, 1964
- Daniel N. Posner. The political salience of cultural difference: Why chewas and tumbukas are allies in zambia and adversaries in malawi. *American Political Science Review*, 98(04):529–545, 2004. ISSN 1537-5943. doi: doi:10.1017/S0003055404041334. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055404041334>
- Mala Htun. Is gender like ethnicity? the political representation of identity groups. *Perspectives on Politics*, 2(03):439–458, 2004. ISSN 1541-0986. doi: doi:10.1017/S1537592704040241. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704040241>
- James Habyarimana, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N Posner, and Jeremy M Weinstein. *Coethnicity: diversity and the dilemmas of collective action*. Russell Sage Foundation, 2009. ISBN 1610446380

2.5. Political Culture [Fall:16]

1. Ann Swidler. Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies. *American Sociological Review*, 51(2):273–286, 1986. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2095521>
2. Keith Darden and Anna Grzymala-Busse. The great divide: Literacy, nationalism, and the communist collapse. *World Politics*, 59(01):83–115, 2006. ISSN 1086-3338. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40060156>
3. Ronald Inglehart. The renaissance of political culture. *American Political Science Review*, 82(04):1203–1230, 1988. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1961756>
4. R.D. Putnam, R. Leonardi, and R.Y. Nanetti. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton paperbacks. Princeton University Press, 1994. ISBN 9781400820740
5. Lisa Wedeen. Conceptualizing culture: Possibilities for political science. *American Political Science Review*, 96(04):713–728, 2002. ISSN 1537-5943. doi: doi:10.1017/S0003055402000400. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055402000400>

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Appendices: Schedules & Full Bibliography

A. Fall 2016

Table 2: Fall 2016 Schedule

Date	Topic
07 Sept	<i>Introduction</i>
14 Sept	1.2 Qualitative Methods, Case Studies & Process-Tracing
21 Sept	2.1 Collective Action & Applications
28 Sept	2.3 Groups & Coalitions
05 Oct	2.4 Identity Politics
12 Oct	2.5 Political Culture
19 Oct	4.2 Non-Electoral Participation
26 Oct	4.3 Revolutions and Regime Change
02 Nov	4.4 Democratization
09 Nov	5.2 Accountability & Citizen/Politician Linkages
16 Nov	6.3 Redistribution & The Welfare State
23 Nov	<i>Thanksgiving Break</i>
30 Nov	6.4 Policy Choice & Policy Reform
07 Dec	<i>Final Exam</i>

B. Spring 2017

Table 3: Spring 2017 Schedule

Date	Topic
19 Jan	<i>Introduction</i>
26 Jan	2.6 Institutions
02 Feb	3.1 The State, Institutions, & State Strength I: Origins
09 Feb	3.1 The State, Institutions, & State Strength II : Bureaucracies
16 Feb	4.1 Political Violence
23 Feb	3.4 Non-Democratic Systems
02 Mar	3.2 Parties & Democratic Systems
09 Mar	3.3 Voting, Elections, & Electoral Systems I: Electoral Systems
16 Mar	<i>Spring Break</i>
23 Mar	5.1 Electoral Participation
30 Mar	3.3 Voting, Elections, & Electoral Systems II: Vote Choice
06 Apr	6.1 Inequality & Polarization
13 Apr	5.3 Corruption
20 Apr	6.2 Growth
27 Apr	<i>Final Exam</i>

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